

The Eighth Army in Korea: The Value of Intangible Leadership

A Monograph

by

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Abstract

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Relevant to the study of leadership is the study of past leaders and their methods. Thus, the study of Matthew B. Ridgway upon becoming the commander of Eighth Army during the Korean War is intriguing for both the brevity and way in which he turned a defeatist army into a capable fighting force. Ridgway characterized leadership as requiring three qualities; character, courage, and competence. It is under these lenses, which this monograph dissects his leadership style to harness for future leaders methods that still apply today.

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Introduction

The Eighth Army in Korea: The Value of Intangible Leadership

Lieutenant General Matthew Bunker Ridgway and his wife Penny were spending the night of 22 December 1950 at the home of a friend enjoying the holiday season. Having finished dinner, they moved from the dining room to enjoy a highball and continued their conversation. The phone rang and his host went to the phone only to return moments later to inform Ridgway that the phone call was for him. Likely confused and wondering who could be calling for him at someone else's house Ridgway answered the phone.¹ On the other end, General J. Lawton Collins, the Army Chief of Staff, broke horrible news and opportunity within the same conversation. Lieutenant General Walton "Johnny" Walker, commander of the Eighth Army on the Korean Peninsula, died earlier that day. Collins explained that General of the Army Douglas A. MacArthur, Supreme Commander Southwest Pacific Area, had a short list of commanders capable of replacing Walker and that Ridgway—the number one on that list—had the support of Collins as well. Ridgway took this in and without a word to his friends or his wife rejoined the conversation though he later could not recall what was discussed as his mind was thousands of miles away contemplating new concerns while looking forward to leading men in combat.² Thus, Ridgway spent the few days remaining before Christmas in 1950 preparing himself to go back to war.

¹ Stanley Weintraub, *MacArthur's War: Korea and the Undoing of an American Hero* (New York: The Free Press, 2000), 289-290.

² George C. Mitchell, *Matthew B. Ridgway: Soldier, Statesman, Scholar, Citizen* (Mechanicsburg: Stackpole Books, 2002), 48-64; Matthew B. Ridgway, *The Korean War* (Garden City: Da Capo Press, Inc., 1967), 79-123.

The next day, Ridgway went into his office at the Pentagon to close out a few things and get ready for his next assignment. He knew well the courage and actions of Walker and the problems he inherited following the debacle of Task Force Smith—representative of an army too at ease with the post-World War II era. Walker had managed to make the difficult work as best he could with the troops and resources available.³ Walker then dealt with retreat to the area near the city of Pusan, called the Pusan Perimeter. Several months later, MacArthur envisioned the risky, but victorious efforts of Operation Chromite—an amphibious assault into the enemy’s rear area at Inchon⁴. This assault created momentary euphoria for the Eighth Army as it advanced north. MacArthur tasked Eighth Army to continue north, ignoring Walker’s warnings, and inviting folly as Eighth Army found itself left open to counterattack by the Chinese. On Thanksgiving Day, the numerically superior Communist Chinese Forces launched a surprise attack against Walker’s dispersed divisions.⁵ Walker struggled to stop the army’s rout, but he lacked the charisma to motivate the weary soldiers, though he managed to be everywhere on the chilly battlefield. It was on one such occasion that Walker drove his jeep too fast for the icy roads and catapulted his vehicle into an oncoming Republic of Korea truck. The accident turned fatal.⁶ Acknowledging

³ Shelby L. Stanton, *America’s Tenth Legion: X Corps in Korea, 1950* (Novato: Presidio Press, 1989), 31-33.

⁴ Ibid., 35-50.

⁵ Michael Burleigh, *Small Wars, Faraway Places: Global Insurrection and the Making of the Modern World, 1945-1965* (New York: Penguin Books, 2013), 147; David McCullough, *Truman* (New York: Simon & Schuster Paperbacks, 1992), 814; 835; T. R. Fehrenbach, *This Kind of War: The Classic Korean War History* (Dulles: Brassey’s, 2000), 47, 251-252; Sheila Jager, *Brothers at War: The Unending Conflict in Korea* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 2013), 141-142.

⁶ Burleigh, *Small Wars, Faraway Places*, 147; Fehrenbach, *This Kind of War*, 258; McCullough, *Truman*, 831; Ridgway, *The Korean War*, 79, 84, 159; Bill Sloan, *The Darkest Summer: Pusan and Inchon 1950 The Battles That Saved South Korea—and the Marines—From Extinction* (New York: Simon & Schuster Inc., 2009), 327-328.

these gruesome facts, Ridgway knew there were challenges ahead. What he did not fully appreciate, several thousands of miles away seated at the Pentagon, the true issue, the psychological state of the Eighth Army. Collins asked Ridgway before he left if he wanted to take anyone with him—the new Eighth Army commander did not take long to consider and replied that he could not in good conscious take someone so close to Christmas as everyone had already made plans and these should not be troubled for his sake.⁷

To understand Ridgway in Korea, one must know the man that came before that fateful holiday phone call. Ridgway, the son of Colonel Thomas Ridgway an artillery officer, knew early that the military fit his personality. Applying to the United States Military Academy he was accepted after first failing to gain entry. He graduated in 1917, a few years after the famed 1915 class, and entered service as a second lieutenant of the Infantry.⁸ In many ways, he—like the famed class of 1915—showed exceptionalism early. His brilliance would not blossom on the fields of battle in World War I, though he longed and tried on many occasions to go. Instead, he taught at his old alma mater under MacArthur who served as the Superintendent at the time. His first time in combat came in World War II, leading the 82nd Airborne Division. Many quickly recognized his prowess, trusted in his abilities, and listened to him when he had concerns

⁷ Mitchell, *Matthew B. Ridgway: Soldier, Statesman, Scholar, Citizen*, 50.

⁸ Ridgway knew many of the officers that graduated in 1915 and would serve with many of them throughout his career. The 1915 graduating class of West Point had the distinction as a group for producing the most generals in any one year group, including the World War II heroes Dwight D. Eisenhower and Omar Bradley along with over fifty other officers that attained the rank of Brigadier General (one star) to General of the Army (five stars). Ridgway also wanted to follow in his father's footsteps and become a field artillery officer but he was selected as an infantry officer which he embraced.

regarding plans.⁹ It was during World War II that the stern Ridgway made a name for himself among soldiers and officers. Ridgway led from the front—literally—he thought a commander needed to be in combat and required it of himself in order to understand the battle. Further, he understood the need to immerse his senses in combat in order to provide guidance and direction during the most critical and time sensitive moments. Already in his forties before becoming an airborne soldier, he made several jumps with the 82nd Airborne Division into many uncertain combat areas gaining the trust and respect of those he led. Before the end of the war, he commanded the XVIII Airborne Corps and in the final days of World War II wound up in the Pacific before Japan sued for peace.¹⁰ His time following World War II saw service in the Caribbean and on the Army G3 Staff and it seemed to many, including Ridgway, that his troop leading days were behind him rather than looming in the future of 1950.

Prior to becoming the commander of Eighth Army, Ridgway's service in the G3 prepared him for what was to come. Already in his mid-fifties, he eagerly kept track of the war and the back and forth progress in Korea with most of his days spent on briefings specifically focused on the war in Korea and on MacArthur's handling of the war. In fact, the Truman Administration and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, headed by General Omar Bradley, sent Ridgway, General Lauris "Larry" Norstad, and Averell Harriman on a fact-finding mission to discover the on the ground truth in August of 1950, due to growing fears that the Korean War was irretrievably lost after less than three months of fighting.¹¹ Harriman went to look at MacArthur and discern the truth of what came out of Japan to the Truman Administration. Ridgway went to evaluate Walker's

⁹ Omar N. Bradley, *A Soldier's Story* (New York: Random House, Inc., 1999), 132-133; David Halberstam, *The Coldest Winter: America and the Korean War* (New York: Hyperion, 2007), 486, 489.

¹⁰ Halberstam, *The Coldest Winter: America and the Korean War*, 490.

¹¹ James F. Schnabel, *Policy and Direction: The First Year* (Washington, DC: Center of Military History United States Army, 1992), 130.

headquarters. Norstad's focus, as an Air Force officer, looked at where the air campaign could improve. During this visit Ridgway, who knew Walker from World War II, realized how in over his head Walker and Eighth Army were:

Ridgway had come away from Korea convinced that Walker would hold the Pusan Perimeter. Enemy pressure was still great enough to force limited tactical withdrawals from the edges of the perimeter and the actual final line had not yet been developed, but the defensive line would be held successfully and the beachhead kept intact. Regardless of his favorable prognosis, General Ridgway was quick to point out that General Walker had a serious problem.¹²

This problem came to the fore especially in regards to the timidity and lack of aggression of the staff. To Ridgway, though, Walker largely lacked the backing necessary to run a successful army and was better matched to terrain that allowed for tank warfare where he had shown his brilliance while serving under General George S. Patton during World War II rather than the infantry requirements of Korea. Tank warfare and thinking could not contend in the devilish terrain that Korea presented as capably as the infantry mindset. Korea was about people rather than equipment. Norstad saw the same thing and as an old friend of Ridgway he pointed out that he should be in command of Eighth Army upon return to the United States.¹³

American historians tend to focus on data points depicting the turnaround of the Eighth Army in Korea to artillery rounds and napalm, rather than to the true nature of how Ridgway managed to turn a rout into the strategic answer required and desired by the Truman Administration.¹⁴ Artillery and napalm did not come into being when Ridgway arrived in Korea

¹² Ibid., 131.

¹³ Ridgway, *The Korean War*, 36-37. Ridgway asked Norstad to leave that part out of the report and was not interested in replacing Walker for head of the Eighth Army fearing that it would destroy Walker's career.

¹⁴ The Army Green Books paint a history removed from emotion and personality of its leaders creating the potential fallacy that equipment wins wars not men. Accessed January 23, 2015, <http://www.history.army.mil/html/bookshelves/collect/usaww2.html>

they had been available, to some degree, to Walker. The difference became that Ridgway knew how to couple technology to soldiers. The late David Halberstam wrote one of the best intertwined histories of the Korean War in his, *The Coldest Winter*, bringing to life personal stories, connecting them to the facts, and to the equipment they used. Bruce Cummings, in his revisionist book, *The Korean War*, focuses most of his attention on the strategic happenings, dates, guerilla warfare, brutality, and the air war.¹⁵ Allan R. Millet's masterpiece, *The War for Korea, 1950-1951: They Came from the North*, adds attention to the coalition hardships particularly of integrating commands by focusing on the Republic of Korea Army, the Korean Augmentees to the US Army, and the Korean Military Advisory Group.¹⁶ The historians with a military background place more emphasis on the leadership side of the argument, but it is a side story in Roy Appleman's *Ridgway Duels for Korea*.¹⁷ The one book that deals directly on leadership in the Korean War, Kenneth Hamburger's *Leadership in the Crucible: The Korean War Battles of Twin Tunnels and Chipyong-ni* is another take from a veteran on the leadership of Colonels Paul Freeman and the French Officer Ralph Monclar.¹⁸ The international history

¹⁵ Halberstam, *The Coldest Winter: America and the Korean War*.

¹⁶ Bruce Cummings, *The Korean War* (New York: Random House, Inc., 2010).

¹⁷ Roy E. Appleman, *Ridgway Duels for Korea* (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1990).

¹⁸ Kenneth E. Hamburger, *Leadership in the Crucible: The Korean War Battles of Twin Tunnels & Chipyong-ni* (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2003); John A. Lynn, *Battle: A History of Combat and Culture from Ancient Greece to Modern America* (New York: Westview Press, 2003), 181-182. The interest in the psychological aspects to war go back to Clausewitz and Napoleon and sparks the awakening of the intangibles of war through a limited vocabulary at the time as the study of psychology was in its infancy. Lieutenant Colonel Ralph Monclar is a fascinating figure in his own right. Monclar took a demotion from General to Lieutenant Colonel because he wanted to lead men and the French contingent was to be no more than a battalion. He worked with Freeman humbly and without complaint though much more senior, leading the French side by side with the Americans.

witnessed in Andrew Salmon's, *To the Last Round: The Epic British Stand on the Imjin River*, while about the normal equipment and capabilities resounds with the preponderance of the history on the people, leadership, and courage.¹⁹ To understand the importance of leadership in war it then becomes imperative to look at the biographies and pay particular attention to where they mesh with the history as seen in Paik Sun Yup's, *From Pusan to Panmunjon*, MacArthur's *Reminiscences*, or Ridgway's, *The Korean War*.²⁰ The vast weight of the history compiled by historians focuses on the tangible, the well documented and fails to pick-up on or slights the remarkable intangibles, and social aspects, which today in the army we call the human dimension. This human dimension is where Ridgway contributed his greatest energy as a commander and brought the Eighth Army back to life.

In a time when the Army looks to the human dimension and how it can affect future wars it should take heed of the present human nature to war, a problem that requires reflection as an institution to address an inward facing concern.²¹ Leadership is the impetus behind creating adaptive, innovative, flexible, creative, and dynamic organizations.²² The Training and Doctrine Command Pamphlet 525-3-7 defines the human dimension thusly:

[E]ncompass[ing] the moral, physical, and cognitive components of Soldier, leader, and organizational development and performance essential to raise, prepare, and employ the Army in full spectrum operations. Army concepts acknowledge the Soldier as the centerpiece of the Army, but none, individually or collectively, adequately addresses the human dimension of future operations. This concept provides an integrating and

¹⁹ Andrew Salmon, *To the Last Round: The Epic British Stand on the Imjin River* (London: Aurum Press, 2009).

²⁰ Douglas MacArthur, *Reminiscences* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1964); Paik Sun Yup, *From Pusan to Panmunjon* (Dulles: Brassey's, 1999); Ridgway, *The Korean War*.

²¹ U.S. Army, "The Human Dimension White Paper: A Framework for Optimizing Human Performance" (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office), 6-24.

²² *Ibid.*, 24.

forcing function that draws on ... highly nuanced human dimension interacting at all levels.²³

This definition seeks change, intending to give rise to discussion at all levels with research into how the Army can best capitalize on this “new” concept, but there is nothing new about the human dimension.²⁴ In fact, the human struggle to war has been key since the very beginning. War is about the human struggle and the psychological capability of the force. Without people, technology and equipment are absent the will and accomplish nothing.²⁵ Leadership is the trait that most defines a commander in the context of battle as an artist worthy of some great ability. As an artist, the leader inspires and creates respect within the subordinates resulting in followership that promotes the creativity and motivation towards the impossible.²⁶ Ridgway called this the “3C’s” of leadership—character, courage, and competence—pointing to character as the ultimate promise of a leader to his subordinates with supporting recognition due to courage and competence.²⁷ Ridgway also saw leadership as a reciprocal relationship, the leader and the led should expect the same of each other.²⁸ Leaders will imbue the army of tomorrow via

²³ U.S. Army TRADOC, “The US Army Concept for the Human Dimension in Full Spectrum Operations, 2015-2024” (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office), 4.

²⁴ Ibid., 3.

²⁵ Edgar F. Puryear, Jr., *American Generalship—Character is Everything: The Art of Command* (New York: The Random House Publishing Group, 2000), 158-159. General George S. Patton in a letter prior to D-Day told his son to read history but to not concern himself with facts like dates or the procedures of a tactic but to note how men react. Further Patton went on to tell his son that weapons change but man remains constant and it is man you must beat.

²⁶ William Deresiewicz, “The Death of the Artist and the Birth of the Creative Entrepreneur,” *The Atlantic* (January/February 2015).

²⁷ Mitchell, *Matthew B. Ridgway: Soldier, Statesman, Scholar, Citizen*, 20-27.

²⁸ Donald Alexander, *The Character of a Leader: A Handbook for the Young Leader* (North Charleston: CreateSpace Independent Publishing, 2013), 2.

leadership providing the psychological edge needed against an uncertain foe in an uncertain location. A question thus becomes, how did Lieutenant General Matthew Bunker Ridgway transform Eighth Army into a capable and successful fighting force?

Perhaps Ridgway's best definition of leadership came when he described it as "an all embracing term" while speaking to a junior officer about leadership.²⁹ Leadership is the intangible that creates tangible success and because it deals with relationships, it must exist from the leader to the led and from the led to the leader; a miscue in the chain and a trust issue ensues. There is a practicality to this relationship in that the leader leads to accomplish a task, a task perceived to be difficult or even impossible, when the led must choose between the leader and any other option. When looking at the Eighth Army before Ridgway, the inevitable defeat at the hands of the Chinese seems not only possible but also highly probable. The "bug-out" or retreat attitude infected Eighth Army's mindset thoroughly when Ridgway inherited it late in December of 1950.³⁰ Frans Osinga, writing on the theories left behind by John Boyd, notes a change in how Boyd looked and understood the term "Command and Control" developing this notion into the

²⁹ Mitchell, *Matthew B. Ridgway: Soldier, Statesman, Scholar, Citizen*, 23.

³⁰ Appleman, *Ridgway Duels for Korea*, 302; Fehrenbach, *This Kind of War: The Classic Korean War History*, 254-261; Hamburger, *Leadership in the Crucible: The Korean War Battles of Twin Tunnels & Chipyong-ni*, 80-81; Victor Davis Hanson, *The Savior Generals: How Five Great Commanders Saved Wars That Were Lost—From Ancient Greece to Iraq* (New York: Bloomsbury Press, 2013), 143-144, 164-165; McCullough, *Truman*, 834-835. "Bug-out" as a term developed the desire to get out of a bad situation without a concern for others around you or the equipment you had brought with you. It permeated the Eighth Army and harkens to the low morale that is captured in its very essence and spirit. An army that does not care about others or the implements of war is a mentally defeated army. Communist Chinese Forces actually developed tactics based on this bug-out mentality and assumed when they captured an American position that they would have enough equipment and ammunition to fight with thus they were only given a few grenades and relied on the Americans to provide everything else.

higher level idea of “Understanding, Monitoring, Appreciation, and Leadership.”³¹ This idea inter-relates and complements well the understanding of Ridgway’s 3C’s, particularly when focusing on the word “appreciation” as a word that evolved for Boyd with leadership out of the more visceral command and control. As defined by Boyd, appreciation encompasses the qualities that recognize the value of people, their perspective, compassion, and the knowledge to lead.³² Ridgway knew well the need to be tough yet compassionate.³³ These qualities enabled Ridgway to turn an army on the brink of defeat into an army ready to go on the offensive taking the fight to a much larger foe.³⁴ Leadership, in Ridgway’s eyes, required commitment to others. General Ridgway accomplished the transformation of Eighth Army via his argument that character, courage, and competence are the requirements of leadership.

The Character to Lead

Leadership requires honesty and passion.³⁵ Ridgway provided both, with equal measure throughout his career these traits. He consciously employed restraints ensuring others did not over-value the search for glory above the life of their soldiers.³⁶ One such incident, during World

³¹ Frans P. B. Osinga, *Science Strategy and War: The Strategic Theory of John Boyd* (New York: Routledge, 2007), 197-200.

³² *Ibid.*, 200.

³³ Halberstam, *The Coldest Winter: America and the Korean War*, 488.

³⁴ Carl Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Columbia University Press, 1989), 87; Michael Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations* (New York: Basic Books, 2006), 122.

³⁵ John S. Sosik and John S. Cameron, “Character and Authentic Transformational Leadership Behavior: Expanding the Ascetic Self Toward Others,” *Consulting Psychology Journal* (2010): 254-260.

³⁶ Halberstam, *The Coldest Winter: America and the Korean War*, 490.

War II, provides the background to understanding Ridgway's character. Serving then in 1943 as the 82nd Airborne Commander he assisted in the capture of the Sorrento region while assisting Fifth Army. There was however, following this hard win, a moment in which he thought the lives of every man in his division would be forfeited in a useless act, an airborne drop into the center of Rome itself with the hoped for belief that the Italians would rally behind and join with the Americans.³⁷ Ridgway knew from reconnaissance that there were well-trained German units in the immediate vicinity and zero assurance that the Italians would support the Americans. This sent him to several of his superiors broaching his concerns which when identified produced many of the same concerns in his superiors.³⁸ Moments before the division was to head skyward the order to cancel the operation came down from General Dwight D. Eisenhower's staff. Ridgway had considered it his duty to inform those above him of issues they were unaware of and to paint them in a more humanistic light, thus saving the division from untold suffering and inconsequential actions that did not help the allies.³⁹ Another event that displays Ridgway's ability to speak honestly without regard for his own career came prior to him replacing Walker as the Eighth Army commander. Vocally, Ridgway came down on the side that the Pentagon needed to get control of MacArthur and that if he continue to work against the president and against the Pentagon that they should have the courage and wherewithal to admonish or fire MacArthur.⁴⁰ A

³⁷ Halberstam, *The Coldest Winter: America and the Korean War*, 489-490; Harold H. Martin, *Soldier: The Memoirs of Matthew B. Ridgway* (New York: The Curtis Publishing Company, 1956), 80.

³⁸ Bradley, *A Soldier's Story*, 166-167; Martin, *Soldier: The Memoirs of Matthew B. Ridgway*, 80-83.

³⁹ Martin, *Soldier: The Memoirs of Matthew B. Ridgway*, 12, 94-98.

⁴⁰ Sloan, *The Darkest Summer: Pusan and Inchon 1950*, 308; Ridgway, *The Korean War*, 60-62.

pin could have dropped after he made this statement. In fact, Collins told Ridgway that he needed to be careful what he said and to whom he said certain things. Ridgway, staying true to his character, rejected this and said he would continue to say what was on his mind because he knew it to be true.⁴¹ These two stories demonstrate the character requirements of leadership and are the intangible motivations that resonate long after the act. Ridgway provides multiple such demonstrations while the Commander, Eighth Army, and these instances, upon examination and reflection, drive the difference.

Ideas and concepts are hard to relate because they do not take on a physical form. Leadership traits often follow this vagueness and manifest based on their significance as interpreted by that group. Thus, character is often expressed through intangible arrangements within the socio-cultural and cognitive perspectives associated with the group, which it is often thought or felt to have occurred especially when eyewitnesses see it tested.⁴² Much in the western study of the psychosomatic field looks at the importance of character and its effects on others and on the organization as a whole. In Myranda Grahek, Dale Thompson and Adria Toliver's study on character and leadership probed participants identifying themselves as followers on the character traits most desired in their leaders. They identified humility, gratitude, and forgiveness as significant attributes applying to leadership successes.⁴³ Ideas that are difficult to measure, form the basis from which we look at interpret leadership. Daniel Goleman, Richard Boyatzis,

⁴¹ Halberstam, *The Coldest Winter: America and the Korean War*, 483; Ridgway, *The Korean War*, 63.

⁴² Peter J. O'Connor and Chris J. Jackson, "Applying a Psychobiological Model of Personality to the Study of Leadership," *Journal of Individual Differences* (2010): 185-194.

⁴³ Myranda S. Grahek, A. Dale Thompson, and Adria Toliver, "The Character to Lead: A Closer Look at Character in Leadership," *Consulting Psychology Journal Practice and Research* 62, no 4 (December 2010): 286.

and Annie McKee remind business leaders in their book *Primal Leadership* that it is at the bottom of an organization the leader affects 50 to almost 75 percent of the organization's personality this demarcation exists solely because of the leader by.⁴⁴ The leader's capacity to set positive conditions determines the bottom's capability to work successfully.⁴⁵ To gain further understanding we can draw from John Schaubroeck, Simon Lam, and Ann Peng that effective leadership needs to be willing and able to both support and follow others "[C]ornerstones of servant leadership include honesty, integrity, trust, and appreciation," in other words leadership is a reciprocal relationship.⁴⁶ Carl Jung, the renowned psychologist, noted the power of imagery and its impact on an organization's collective experience and that leadership needs to exhibit these qualities.⁴⁷ It helps the subordinates to recognize you as a part of them and not wholly separated and unaware. To know and appreciate the edge of the organization, leaders have to move between the edge and the upper echelons of the organization seamlessly—something Ridgway excelled at and a mark of his leadership.⁴⁸

Ridgway found character quite compelling within the general quality of leadership. He ensured quickly that his ability to lead expressed in everything he said or did to set a standard by

⁴⁴ Daniel Goleman, Richard Boyatzis, and Annie McKee, *Primal Leadership: Unleashing the Power of Emotional Intelligence* (Boston: Harvard Business Review Press, 2013), 18.

⁴⁵ Ibid., 18.

⁴⁶ John Schaubroeck, Simon S. K. Lam, and Ann Chunyan Peng, "Cognition-Based and Affect-Based Trust as Mediators of Leader Behavior Influences on Team Performance," *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 96, no.4 (July 2011): 864-866; Grahek, Thompson, and Toliver, "The Character to Lead: A Closer Look at Character in Leadership."

⁴⁷ Angeles Arrien, "Accessing Power" ed. Rick Fields, *The Awakened Warrior: Living with Courage, Compassion, and Discipline* (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1994), 109.

⁴⁸ Marion B. Eberly, et al., "An Integrative Process Model of Leadership: Examining Loci, Mechanisms, and Event Cycles," 427-441; Ridgway, *The Korean War*, 79-123; Paik Sun Yup, *From Pusan to Panmunjom*, 120.

which others could emulate. The Eighth Army noted his character soon after his arrival and many came to refer to Ridgway as the “miracle,” “the man who came to dinner,” and “an honor we didn’t deserve.” These were honest reactions elicited by the troops in response to his leadership style made distinct by simple, yet meaningful acts of appreciation, compassion, and concern.⁴⁹

Ridgway’s own explanation of character showed the significance he placed on this idea:

[C]haracter as the bedrock on which the whole edifice of leadership rests[It] stands for self-discipline, loyalty, readiness to accept responsibility, and willingness to admit mistakes. It [further] stands for selflessness, modesty, humility, willingness to sacrifice when necessary, and... for faith⁵⁰

Viewed through this definition, character is a component necessary to understanding a piece of the leadership puzzle. Ridgway exhibited character through the utility of imagery, compassion, trust, and respect to bring about the positive psychological change in how Eighth Army fights and looks at itself. Arriving in Korea, late on 26 December 1950 Ridgway was physically struck by the depth of the winter’s cold grip on not only the physically blasted and unwelcome terrain of Korea, but the young men lying in the snow with inadequate gear to stave off the cold.⁵¹ Vernon A. Good, a Marine engineer during those cold days in the winter of 1950 related in an interview

⁴⁹ Halberstam, *The Coldest Winter: America and the Korean War*, 498; Hastings, *The Korean War*, 190; McCullough, *Truman*, 833-834; Robert Uth and Phylis Geller, “Korean War Stories,” PBS Home Video, 17 June 2003.

⁵⁰ Mitchell, *Matthew B. Ridgway: Soldier, Statesman, Scholar, Citizen*, 20.

⁵¹ Halberstam, *The Coldest Winter: America and the Korean War*, 218-219, 370, 400, 433-434, 491-492; McCullough, *Truman*, 834. MacArthur, seemingly, had not been concerned enough upon pushing for and launching the attack on Inchon or its aftermath to get much needed cold weather gear to the troops. Why Walker failed to fix this issue lies in the poor relationship between him and MacArthur. General O. P. Smith of 1st Marine Division voiced his concerns over the cold to General Almond of X Corps and was rebuffed. Ridgway did not suffer from the issues encountered by Walker or Smith and made supply operations work.

how horrific that winter cold and deep snow were and how the lack of cold weather gear gnawed at the troops' ability to concentrate on the enemy.⁵²

The weather was a severely limiting factor to the troops in Korea and required immediate attention as it contributed to a desire of the men to hunker down. Like the weather, the mood of Eighth Army had frozen over. Ridgway knew he had to change the atmosphere quickly recalling that:

The men I met along the road... conveyed to me a conviction that this was a bewildered army, not sure of itself or its leaders, not sure what they were doing there, wondering when they would hear the whistle of that homebound transport. There was obviously much to be done to restore this army to a fighting mood [T]he food was insufficient, not always on time, and not always hot; there was no stationary for a man to write home on; clothing was not suited to the weather.

Immediately, within a course of three to five days, Ridgway would push the supply system to get much needed cold weather gear to the troops.⁵³ Ridgway recognized from his time spent fighting the Germans during the Battle of the Bulge that many an infantryman misplaced his gloves while firing or being fired at by the enemy and had to do later without their gloves. Gloves easily became lost to the mud and snow leaving fingers exposed to the elements and causing frostbite in extreme circumstances thus creating a larger pool of combat ineffective soldiers. Soldiers who lost their gloves worried about their fingers and the cold rather than the clever enemy. To curb the loss of gloves Ridgway brought gloves wherever he went and handed them out to soldiers he saw without.⁵⁴ He knew that a man who was less worried about freezing was more aware of his surroundings quickly addressed the necessity and practicalities of the situation.⁵⁵ He went further

⁵² Vernon A. Good, John A. Adams '71 Center for Military History and Strategic Analysis: Military Oral History Project, VMI Archives Military Oral History Database, accessed February 6, 2015, <http://www1.vmi.edu/archivecoldwar>.

⁵³ Appleman, *Ridgway Duels for Korea*, 25; Hamburger, *Leadership in the Crucible*, 82.

⁵⁴ Jager, *Brothers at War: The Unending Conflict in Korea*, 157.

⁵⁵ Ridgway, *The Korean War*, 87.

and took great care to get hats, jackets, and better boots to the freezing troops. However, he also admonished their quickness to abandon their rifles, tanks, and artillery pieces. If Ridgway was going to provide them with the uniform items necessary to fight then he expected his soldiers to do their jobs and care for their equipment, there would be no more abandoning their gear if they needed to withdraw—withdrawals would be orderly and would retain the spirit of the army and its abilities. The Eighth Army and Ridgway equally shared the needs of the other balanced further to the needs of the mission and situation.

Character is also a modicum of image heavily ladled with truth in order to create belief and support in the leader by the followers. This helps the subordinates recognize the leader as a part of them and not wholly separated and unaware, even if the men are not physically present when the words or actions of leadership resonate. The people within the organization commit to the transfer of these thoughts and deeds to other parts of the organization. That is, you have “skin in the game.”⁵⁶ In an interview done years later a retired marine colonel told the interviewer about bad leadership and good leadership. In describing the good leader, he said:

I was impressed with the fact that [Corporal] Davis cared about us, the members of his squad. He didn't use the four-letter word “love” but he did exercise the four-letter word “care” in everything that he did. As I mentioned earlier about what I wouldn't do for Corporal Reiser and his kind of leadership, with Corporal Davis I would do anything for that guy. I would do it whether I knew that he would have the opportunity to find out; I would do it because I knew he would want it done. He was just that kind of person.⁵⁷

⁵⁶ Nassim N. Taleb, *Antifragile: Things that Gain from Disorder*, 65-82, accessed March 2, 2015, http://www.econtalk.org/archives/2013/09/taleb_on_skin_i.html.

⁵⁷ Wesley L. Fox, interviewed by Andrew Baity, 5 February 2010, John A. Adams '71 Center for Military History and Strategic Analysis: Military Oral History Project, accessed February 6, 2015, www.vmi.edu/archives. The “Reiser,” Colonel (ret.) Fox refers to was responsible for their training at boot camp and showed no concern or care for the well-being of those he was responsible to train denying them such necessities as water after a full day of training in the hot and humid sun of Parris Island, 4.

In this vein Ridgway said, “A soldier’s fortitude and faith in the authority over him is greatly bolstered when his commanding officer is directing military operations at the front sharing with him the dangers of enemy fire. . .”⁵⁸ To this effect, Ridgway went to the front wearing what he had worn as the 82nd and later XVIII Airborne Commander during World War II—his Airborne webbing with a grenade on the right side and a medical kit on the left.⁵⁹ The general often found his way into the very blasted holes the men held on the front lines and they came to recognize him as a “Soldier’s General” and by his second day in Korea Ridgway visited most of the front and all but one division.⁶⁰ Most importantly, and more than looking the part of Soldier, Ridgway stayed at the front to show the soldiers and their officers that he would endure what they endured.

⁵⁸ Halberstam, *The Coldest Winter: America and the Korean War*, 395; Mitchell, *Matthew B. Ridgway: Soldier, Statesman, Scholar, Citizen*, 33. MacArthur never spent a night in Korea, in truth Korea was not his concern. A wider war with China was his focus and where he wanted to use Chiang Kai-Shek and atomic weapons to destroy communism his mortal enemy during the Korean War. Korea in MacArthur’s mind was no more than the sideshow the real powers were using to play with each other. MacArthur became embroiled, therefore, with Washington and the Pentagon launching a verbal sparring war. Washington and the Pentagon though, saw things very differently and knew escalating the war would likely have other unintended consequences like increasing the involvement of the Soviet Union.

⁵⁹ Appleman, *Ridgway Duels for Korea*, 8, 34; Halberstam, *The Coldest Winter: America and the Korean War*, 491; Hamburger, *Leadership in the Crucible: The Korean War Battles of Twin Tunnels & Chipyong-ni*, 81; Allan R. Millett, *The War for Korea, 1950-1951: They Came from the North* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2010), 379; Salmon, *To the Last Round: The Epic British Stand on the Imjin River, Korea 1951*, 66. There are a few stories that circulate and have the men of Eighth Army referring to Ridgway as “Iron Tits.” This comes from the media getting the story wrong and publishing that he wore a grenade on each side of his harness. A picture of Ridgway in David McCullough’s book *Truman* gets it wrong and calls the two items on his harness hand grenades (after page 576 picture 17). The men loved it and thought it at first funny but later this became a symbol of the soldiers and the fierce commander and their love for him. The wrong story had another effect: it started a love affair with the American people, for whom the war now seemed quite different, towards Ridgway who would be on the cover of both Time and Life magazines.

⁶⁰ Appleman, *Ridgway Duels for Korea*, 8; Eliot A. Cohen and John Gooch, *Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of Failure in War* (New York: Free Press, 2006), 33-34; Halberstam, *The Coldest Winter: America and the Korean War*, 491-492.

This placing himself in harm's way, largely spoke to correcting the spirit of the Eighth Army and pushed officers to move out of their far away command posts and onto the hills and valleys that their men occupied.⁶¹ Ridgway knew well the climate caused by the weather and the social climate of his Army and understood the effects of both on his soldiers and the leadership. Ridgway's feeling about command and soldiers showed his compassion and gratitude for the hardships the men faced day in and day out:

A commander must have far more concern for the welfare of his men than he has for his own safety.... The execution of the soldier's mission is just as vitally important, because it is the sum total of all these missions, properly executed, which produces the results of the big unit. All lives are equal on the battlefield, and a dead rifleman is as great a loss, in the sight of God, as a dead general. The dignity which attaches to the individual is the basis of western civilization, and that fact should be remembered by every commander... Every man has his breaking point. If treated sympathetically and humanely, a soldier suffering from 'battle fatigue' will return to the line, a brave soldier.⁶²

Ridgway never shied from a fight or from the sound of combat (explored in Section 2 on Courage of this paper) and this contributed to the removal of the "bugout" phenomenon from Eighth Army's lexicon.⁶³ On the other hand, it is important to remember that while he did not shy from combat he did not needlessly send the soldiers under his care to absolute slaughter, nor did he permit other leaders to trivialize the use of soldiers under their care.⁶⁴ Instead, Ridgway instituted

⁶¹ Hamburger, *Leadership in the Crucible*, 80-85.

⁶² Appleman, *Ridgway Duels for Korea*, 18.

⁶³ Appleman, *Ridgway Duels for Korea*, 141; Hamburger, *Leadership in the Crucible*, 81; Jager, *Brothers at War: The Unending Conflict in Korea*, 154-155; Sinclair W. Stickle, *So They Will Know: A Korean War Memoir* (San Bernadino, CA: CreateSpace, 2013), 13-14. Interestingly enough there was a song popular with the 2nd Infantry Division that referenced "bugout" though the leadership frowned upon its use.

⁶⁴ Jager, *Brothers at War: The Unending Conflict in Korea*, 169-171; Salmon, *To the Last Round: The Epic British Stand on the Imjin River, Korea 1951*, 68.

care and concern for brother and sister units further instilling within the fighting men that they were not alone.

The visual and vocalized manifestations are a hallmark of command and leadership.⁶⁵ Ridgway made a point to get out to physically understand every unit's position and situation to assess not only Eighth Army's capabilities but the capacity of the leaders under his command. He managed to do so with all those on the front engaged with the enemy.⁶⁶ He believed in seeing and feeling the ground and the men fighting first hand.⁶⁷ In getting out, his aide noted on several occasions that Ridgway was often in harm's way and there were times his aide thought that he should take more care in how he exposed himself to the enemy.⁶⁸ The general was not reckless. He was not a fool nor did he place others in danger. What the Eighth Army Commander did do though, is provide to the fighting men the knowledge that their commander was there on the ground. He knew what he was asking for when he asked men to hold their ground, withdraw, or attack. Ridgway knew the terrain, the dangers, the cold and he was in it as much as they were. He also believed in providing the men with tangibles that changed their perceptions in more subtle

⁶⁵ Douglas R. Lindsay, David V. Day, and Stanley M. Halpin, "Shared Leadership in the Military: Reality, Possibility, or Pipedream?" *Military Psychology* 23, no. 5 (September 2011): 536-537.

⁶⁶ Appleman, *Ridgway Duels for Korea*, 9-14. The one unit he did not visit was a unit not engaged and was sitting in the most peaceful sector.

⁶⁷ J. D. Coleman, *Wonju: The Gettysburg of the Korean War* (Dulles: Brassey's, 2000), 39; Hamburger, *Leadership in the Crucible*, 82-83.

⁶⁸ Hamburger, *Leadership in the Crucible*, 83-84; Jager, *Brothers at War: The Unending Conflict in Korea*, 158.

ways. One such subtle change within Eighth Army involved Ridgway, linen, and the china available for meals. Ridgway believed that the trivial things mattered as much as the big things.⁶⁹

The Twenty-ninth Glosters were one such unit surrounded and cut-off by the Communist Chinese Forces. Ridgway felt particularly strong about leaving men and units lost in the middle and his continuous push to hold and help the Twenty-ninth showed his temerity, compassion and understanding of his fragile base—a force dependent on the goodwill of its coalition.⁷⁰ On 3 January 1951, parts of the British Brigade found itself mired in heavy and deadly fighting with the Communist Chinese Forces, a fight for its very survival to reach a roadblock established by Second Battalion, Twenty-seventh Infantry along the road leading south from Kaesong to Seoul less than five miles long, led by Lieutenant Colonel Gordon E. Murch.⁷¹ Ordered to hold the roadblock for only a few hours, Murch decided to stay well into the next morning. Murch understood that not all of the units had crossed through to safety. Murch knew the missing unit needed time and so he placed his men at risk to hold the closing line until finally ordered to withdraw by the corps.⁷² This departure effectively left part of the Twenty-ninth Brigade in “no man’s land” and in the valley and hills north of Eighth Army’s newly established defensive line with the Communist Chinese Forces. The Chinese stunned the Twenty-ninth with their speed and viciousness as they came down on the British from all sides, barring their way south along the

⁶⁹ Eliot A. Cohen, and John Gooch, *Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of Failure in War* (New York: Free Press, 2005). 34.

⁷⁰ William Steuck, *The Korean War: An International History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 130.

⁷¹ Appleman, *Ridgway Duels for Korea*, 64-68.

⁷² Salmon, *To the Last Round: The Epic British Stand on the Imjin River, Korea 1951*, 68.

road and short of the promised safety of Murch's roadblock.⁷³ Ridgway found out a few hours later that not all of the men made it through and immediately sent troops and helicopters into the area to find the men of the beleaguered unit. The Glosters commander, Major General Thomas Brodie, tried to call the search off due to the futility and likelihood that no one survived that would allow for an efficacious search and rescue.⁷⁴ It is important to note, that this was not because Brodie did not care, rather he did not want more men to die trying to rescue men who were already dead in his mind. Murch and another battalion signaled their readiness to go in and get the remnants of the Twenty-ninth. Ridgway pushed the staff, corps and division commanders to search for and rescue the missing soldiers of the British unit. After a few hours of searching, a small pocket of men—rescued by helicopter—made it back to friendly lines, but most soldiers of the Twenty-ninth ended their fight captured or killed by the Chinese.⁷⁵ This loyalty that Ridgway displayed to coalition forces and in general to soldiers in the roughest of predicaments cemented in the minds of Eighth Army that their leadership genuinely cared, was willing to show compassion, and committed to fighting for them when the chips were down.⁷⁶ This then shows character as a quasi-feedback loop in which one part assures the virtue of the other who then reciprocates. Ridgway considered the event a failure though as he believed people were too slow to act and that his order to not allow a coalition partner pull rear guard for the American Forces a huge disgrace. Next time the Eighth Army Commander would ensure tighter controls and manage the attack to instill aggression and the warrior spirit.

⁷³ Appleman, *Ridgway Duels for Korea*, 68, 75.

⁷⁴ Salmon, *To the Last Round: The Epic British Stand on the Imjin River, Korea 1951*, 311-314.

⁷⁵ Appleman, *Ridgway Duels for Korea*, 74-75.

⁷⁶ Salmon, *To the Last Round: The Epic British Stand on the Imjin River, Korea 1951*, 65.

Ridgway went from a man enjoying a highball with friends moments before Christmas in 1950 to a man turning a defeated army around in the middle of winter and pushing back at a communist army larger than his amalgamated parts with no hiccup to his stride. His ability to go from office life to the hardships of war in less time than it takes to deploy a unit today came from his strength of character. His understanding of honesty, relationships and perspectives, imagery, and compassion brought about a change in the Eighth Army that removed distress and immobility and in its place molded the character of the army in his image. He set the tone and provided the expectation that soldiers could and should have in their leadership, which he exemplified repeatedly in various ways and with different segments of his army. He accepted nothing less in his subordinate commanders and they in turn started acting in accordance with his character. With a renewed and determined character that came from the commander of the Eighth Army, the soldiers and leaders would show their courage. The army's transformation from defeat to empowerment has a few more factors to bear in mind and the next section will look at the value of courage from a commander down to the men fighting on the line.

The Courage to Lead and Follow

Courage is not about irresponsibility nor is it entirely about the cold and methodical. Courage is a balance of spirit within the commander, an understanding of the self, the organization, the environment, and the resources available to answer the needs of a given situation, corresponding with character, courage is all-embracing.⁷⁷ Courage is about steeling oneself for hardships and pain for the physical stresses as well as the mental stresses, which

⁷⁷ Gerald F. Sewell, "Emotional Intelligence and the Army Leadership Requirements Model," *Military Review* (Nov/Dec 2009): 93-98.

requires so much of the combat soldier.⁷⁸ Courage is risk.⁷⁹ Ridgway defined courage by dividing it between physical, the easy form, and moral, the harder form, of courage. Both are required.

Courage thus equated to:

[T]he development of self-control, self-discipline, physical endurance, of knowledge of one's job and, therefore of confidence.... [Further] these qualities minimized fear and maximized sound judgment under pressure...." Ridgway further opined that examples of moral courage were less well known but were 'proof of true greatness of soul.'"⁸⁰

He extolled commanders and leaders to never forget the exacting charge of command—the lives of those he leads—that the significance of their men is great and their use should be measured against energetically securing the requirements of the mission and balanced by the compassion necessary to not throw heartlessly these same men to the slaughter of battle.⁸¹ The studies on moral and physical courage attempt to account for the multiplicities of courage and how we sense and recognize them. Courage is more than doing and being. Courage requires thought and anticipation. It is doing the right thing for the most correct gain.

The study involving physical and moral courage is a study based largely on actions. This is dichotomous though, in that courage is a more personal quality of leadership and requires some prying loose from other contexts. Surveying what has happened or meticulously taken notes providing the background thoughts by leaders are largely what we have to study within this area. Courage is probably the hardest dimension of leadership to measure, because it is the most

⁷⁸ Hamburger, *Leadership in the Crucible*, 68-74.

⁷⁹ Gary Mack and David Casstevens, *Mind Gym: An Athletes Guide to Inner Excellence* (New York: McGraw-Hill Books, 2001), 25-28.

⁸⁰ Mitchell, *Matthew B. Ridgway: Soldier, Statesman, Scholar, Citizen*, 20-21. In the book *Primal Leadership*, the authors say the same thing Ridgway does—see 79-80.

⁸¹ Mitchell, *Matthew B. Ridgway: Soldier, Statesman, Scholar, Citizen*, 21.

intangible and largely judged by others through a spectrum. Salvatore Maddi writes on the aspect of hardiness. Hardiness relates to courage enabling the individual or group to survive and thrive beyond shocks and discomfort to facilitate accomplishment.⁸² Elaine Kinsella, Timothy Ritchie, and Eric Igou look of the phenomena called heroism and the social structural significance of the idea of the heroic as it imparts duty and responsibility in a military sense that is ultimately for others and that these heroes are required to triumph over failure.⁸³ Kelly Fisher, Kate Hutchings, and James Sarros refer to leadership's need, especially when fixated on life and death matters, to discover a person with the "right stuff." Insomuch as the individual leading has the capacity to abstain from demoralization brought about by the sights and sounds of battle and coupled with the ability to act via the conduction of violence upon the enemy.⁸⁴ Sean Hannah and Bruce Avolio further promotes that the moral center of responsibility is the fulcrum between understanding and acting providing an ethical state to resolution of a problem.⁸⁵ Stewart Gabel talks about how leaders can transform the organization through positional acumen and sincerity, self-actualization, and by understanding, multiple situations and problems in order to make decisions from the mundane to the significant and that this has a reciprocal effect on the subordinates who internalize the external the leader provides.⁸⁶ Courage is about the implicit and

⁸² Salvatore Maddi, "Relevance of Hardiness Assessment and Training to the Military Context," *Military Psychology* 19, no.1 (2007): 61-62.

⁸³ Elaine L. Kinsella, Timothy D. Ritchie, and Eric R. Igou, "Zeroing in on Heroes: A Prototype Analysis of Hero Features," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 108 (January 2015): 114-116.

⁸⁴ Kelly Fisher, Kate Hutchings, and James C. Sarros. "The "Bright" and "Shadow" Aspects of in Extremis Leadership," *Military Psychology* (January 2010): 89-94.

⁸⁵ Sean T. Hannah and Bruce J. Avolio. "Moral Potency: Building the Capacity for Character-Based Leadership," *Consulting Psychology Journal Practice and Research* 62, no 4 (December 2010): 291-293.

⁸⁶ Stewart Gabel. "Psychotherapy and Relationship-Based Change: It's About Leadership," *Journal of Psychotherapy Integration* 23, no.4 (December 2013): 345-354.

intangible emphases of communal desires for action and perseverance. Ridgway's time as the commander of Eighth Army reveals how he applied courage to the tricky and diverse problems in Korea.

Ridgway knew he had to impart to the Eighth Army the reasons behind the need to fight the communists, why South Korea mattered, and what their accomplishment would provide to the world. Ridgway had to deliver the narrative to make Eighth Army see the sense for what needs doing and to provide the wherewithal to get the army to fight rather than flee. In an article written about the Battle of Chipyong-ni, Keith Landry remarked that leadership is about, "A portion of doing the right thing [it] is the obligation officers have, as members of the profession of arms, to continually seek self-improvement as leaders."⁸⁷ Ridgway's understanding that the war in Korea lacked a narrative required the immediate production that brought about understanding to the soldiers and their leaders. Ridgway produced in late January, less than thirty days after his arrival, the memorandum entitled "Why We Are Here," in order to provide the grounding necessary for a man to be able to give his life for a cause.⁸⁸ He acquits at the very beginning of the memorandum that he has listened to the concerns of others in his travel and that their concerns have not fallen to the wayside but have remained at the fore of Ridgway's mind and how he sees the spiritual force of his army.

We are here because of the decisions of the properly constituted authorities of our respective governments. As the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, General of the Army Douglas MacArthur said publicly yesterday: "This command intends to maintain a military position in Korea.... The answer is simple because further comment is unnecessary. It is conclusive because the loyalty we give, and expect, precludes any slightest questioning of these orders."⁸⁹

⁸⁷ Keith A. Landry, "Leadership in Battle: The Siege at Chipyong-ni," *Army* (September 2002): 52.

⁸⁸ Matthew B. Ridgway, "Why We are Here," (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Ridgway Collection).

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*

With this simple pronouncement, the general reminded the army that their purpose was simple and further legitimized the army in Korea as well as the respective legitimacy of the civilians to order the military to fight. The rest of the memorandum tackles the richer question in Ridgway's mind of "What are we fighting for?"⁹⁰ Herein he lays out succinctly the reason why men should be willing to struggle and if necessary die:

It is not a question of this or that Korean town or village. Real estate is, here, incidental.... The real issues are whether the power of Western civilization... shall defy and defeat communism; whether the rule of men who shoot their prisoners, enslave their citizens, and deride the dignity of man, shall displace the rule of those to whom the individual and his individual rights are sacred⁹¹

Ridgway endeavored to bring the narrative of what makes free men from free countries strive to maintain their sense of being and bridged the gap for fighting in Korea by pointing out that free men in Korea deserved the same capability to enjoy life as known to those who cherish freedom. Ridgway made the implicit explicit in the minds of those he led by simply reminding them of who they were and the joys they experienced because of who they were.

"Find them! Fix them! Fight them! Finish them!"⁹² Ridgway meant these words and Eighth Army came to know and understand these words and their significance to the fight. The Commander of the Eighth Army, as an infantryman knew that the terrain of Korea dictated a need for movement that was unrestricted in both thought and action. His first assessment of the Eighth Army characterized it as an army unwilling to get off the roads and move into the land to take the

⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁹¹ Ibid.

⁹² Halberstam, *The Coldest Winter: America and the Korean War*, 493; Ridgway, *The Korean War*, 89.

high ground.⁹³ Leaders needed to move out of the comfort of the command posts and move to the edges where the men were fighting. Getting to the edges also meant getting off the roads and out of the valleys to fight a battle better suited to the infantry mind. Courage moved the army off the road, gave it the necessary push to believe and trust in their leaders, and in this war, men focused on the fight set the tone. Instead of the terrain and the enemy dictating the fight to the Eighth Army, the Eighth Army would use the terrain to take the fight to the enemy. The general was adamant about commanders knowing the terrain as it instilled confidence and the ability to apply the right approaches to the fight.⁹⁴ Knowing the terrain gives leaders the edge as options open up and the cognitive ability of a commander broadens to see the possibilities of the ground and not limited to roads and easy paths. This engendered an offensive minded spirit or what is sometimes referred to as the “Spirit of the Bayonet,” a willingness of the mind and body to attack and accept the hardships of that attack.⁹⁵ To move and engage requires different thought of action than the desire to remain safe and road bound. This is like resting on one’s heels versus being on the toes as a boxer’s mental movement mixed with physical movement creates a more aggressive and less passive circumstance.⁹⁶

⁹³ Halberstam, *The Coldest Winter: America and the Korean War*, 151-152; Hamburger, *Leadership in the Crucible: The Korean War Battles of Twin Tunnels & Chipyeong-ni*, 80-81; Ridgway, *The Korean War*, 88-89.

⁹⁴ Gen Matthew Ridgway, (Lecture, School of Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 9 May 1984).

⁹⁵ Hamburger, *Leadership in the Crucible*, 165-166; Landry. “Leadership in Battle: The Siege at Chipyeong-ni,” 94; Harold Winton, (Lecture, School of Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 9 May 1984).

⁹⁶ Maddi, “Relevance of Hardiness Assessment and Training to the Military Context,” 63. Maddi relates this interesting phenomenon thusly: “The . . . study also showed that . . . employees high in the hardy attitudes showed the action pattern of coping with stressful circumstances by facing them (rather than being in denial) and struggling to turn them from potential disasters into opportunities (rather than avoiding them or blaming others). Socially, the hardy employees were

Ridgway had a no nonsense view when it came to people and this included how you went about sacking people. When he assumed command of the Eighth Army, he was disgusted at the defeatist attitude on the staff as well as several all of his division and corps commanders. When the general—briefed by one officer of the Eighth Army on the plans for withdrawal after specifically telling the staff he did not want to hear about withdrawal—fired the G3, Colonel John Jeter sending a message loudly and clearly to the entire command.⁹⁷ There would be no more talk of withdrawals. No more talk of flight from the Korean Peninsula. Ridgway gave others a chance to hang themselves and eventually replaced commanders after he gave them time to show their ability to his demands. Friendship offered no quarter. Ridgway replaced Major General Frank Milburn after a few months of remaining at the latter's command post to promote an aggressive spirit in his old friend.⁹⁸ Major General Edward Mallory "Ned" Almond, commander of Tenth Corps, ended up promoted out of his job because Ridgway found him to be too aggressive and dangerous to his command.⁹⁹ Expunging the command of leaders who could not perform to his

more involved in building patterns of interaction . . . rather than undermining competition or overprotection."

⁹⁷ Halberstam, *The Coldest Winter: America and the Korean War*, 498-499; Ridgway, *The Korean War*, 105, 108-109. In fairness to Jeter he was in the wrong spot at the wrong time and Ridgway was tired of hearing the same from the entire command. Halberstam further remarks that Ridgway became known as "Wrongway Ridgway" for pushing the staff and the commanders to start thinking about the offensive rather than retreat. Respect was something Ridgway grudgingly earned from Eighth Army because he forced them to think differently and started to provide results that showed his different way of thinking actually worked.

⁹⁸ Halberstam, *The Coldest Winter: America and the Korean War*, 498; Ridgway, *The Korean War*, 98.

⁹⁹ Appleman, *Ridgway Duels for Korea*, 300-301; Halberstam, *The Coldest Winter: America and the Korean War*, 427-430; Hamburger, 92-93; Stanton, 100. Almond though aggressive shows the danger inherent in someone who does not understand the balance of men and mission. Almond's tenacity cannot be understated but his arrogance led to many issues with his subordinates including Colonel Freeman, and General O. P. Smith commander of 1st Marine

standards and expectations, he created room for and an understanding among subordinates that could then inculcate Ridgway's form of leadership into their own pushing his methods down to the entire command. A few commanders succeeded after they received a warning. One such commander, Colonel William J. McCaffrey who commanded the Thirty-first Infantry Regiment remembered his warning from Ridgway and endeavored not to cross him again. Ridgway would not condone from commanders failure in the basics.¹⁰⁰ The general held leaders to a higher standard requiring them to acquit themselves in a way that commanded respect from those below.¹⁰¹ Courage required a different mindset and Ridgway needed leaders that understood that or moved aside to make room for those who received Ridgway's message and internalized this message of courage.

The importance of the little known battle of Chipyong-ni highlights the importance of courage. Ridgway weighed the cost and needs of Chipyong-ni against the significance of the future and current defense of Eighth Army and denied a request from the Twenty-third Infantry

Division and always seemingly at odds with how incautious Almond waged war and failed to plan.

¹⁰⁰ Appleman, *Ridgway Duels for Korea* 19-20. In fairness, McCaffrey's "failure" resulted in a misread of his coordinates by the staff at 7th Division but the end result was the same the message went out to all commanders that expectations and requirements had been raised by the new Eighth Army Commander.

¹⁰¹ Frederic Laloux, *Reinventing Organizations: A Guide to Creating Organizations Inspired by the Next Stage of Human Consciousness* (Brussels: Nelson Parker, 2014), 126-129, 187-188. Leaders have to be able to look at the structure of their organization and determine how best to restructure in the face of problems whether it be the person does not fit the requirements or is unable to function as is required by the task or environment. Leadership in the Army thus falls into a "self-managing style" where commanders make the assessment of their people and their level of suitability while also controlling a variety of ways to handle and conduct dismissals which is good for the organization.

Regiment to withdraw.¹⁰² Colonel Freeman, the commander of the 23rd acknowledged and went on to fight, though encircled by the Chinese, a critical series of battles that lasted three weeks.¹⁰³ Instead of asking to leave or withdraw a second time, when the fighting grew worse, Freeman countered the Chinese attack. Freeman knew the type of leadership required and remained at the front with his soldiers. Even wounded, Freeman refused to leave the front though Almond sent his own operations officer as replacement.¹⁰⁴ Freeman went on to argue with his division commander and the deputy commander of the division who tried to order and then reason with Freeman in order to get him to leave his command during a long radio call.¹⁰⁵ In Ridgway's thinking, the basic prerequisite of command placed the responsibility squarely on the commander existing at the nexus or at the "crisis of action," or where the going was toughest.¹⁰⁶ He further expounded on this elemental responsibility by stating that the commander had to "drink in and experience the situation to understand the human element," and acknowledged the importance of the higher commander to leave room for the subordinate to request support and capability from higher echelons.¹⁰⁷ Freeman tenaciously held onto the ground and his command, persevering

¹⁰² Hamburger, *Leadership in the Crucible*, 165-166; Landry, "Leadership in Battle: The Siege at Chipyong-ni," 152-154; Jager. *Brothers at War: The Unending Conflict in Korea*, 169-171, 184.

¹⁰³ Landry, "Leadership in Battle: The Siege at Chipyong-ni," 53-54; Ridgway. *The Korean War*, 106-107.

¹⁰⁴ Hamburger, *Leadership in the Crucible*, 165-166; Landry, "Leadership in Battle: The Siege at Chipyong-ni," 155, 166.

¹⁰⁵ Hamburger, *Leadership in the Crucible*, 165-166; Keith A. Landry, "Leadership in Battle: The Siege at Chipyong-ni," 165-166.

¹⁰⁶ Gen Matthew Ridgway, (Lecture, School of Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 9 May 1984).

¹⁰⁷ Gen Matthew Ridgway, (Lecture, School of Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 9 May 1984). It is interesting to provide a counterpoint to this highlighted in Martin L. Cook, *The Moral Warrior: Ethics and Service in the U.S. Military* (Albany: State

alongside his men and retaining the area around Chipyeong-ni, which set future combat actions for the command up for success and began to restore the confidence men had in their leaders.¹⁰⁸ One can never remove the human variable when looking at combat.¹⁰⁹ Freeman's desire to stay with his men gave his men the necessary example of courage and means to remain in the fight ostensibly minimizing their fear and exhibiting strength of body and mind though wounded, outnumbered, and surrounded by the Chinese forces. At the end of Chipyeong-ni the fighting spirit was restored having managed to defend against the onslaught of a Chinese offensive.

With their confidence restored, Eighth Army went on the offensive. Ridgway knew the answer and the answer was to attack. Violence is a way to steal momentum but it is also a way to control the action and facilitates courage. Being the actor is better than allowing the enemy to dictate your reaction to the situation. The wording we use to convey violence and how we talk about violence is as important as the act of violence. Ridgway acknowledged this by naming operations Killer, Ripper, and Roundup to portray honestly the purpose of these offensive operations.¹¹⁰ A few of these named operations became a sticking point with the Pentagon and Washington for which Ridgway had to fight to keep the names true to their purpose, a fight he

University of New York Press, 2004), 90-93 that military leadership has become risk averse and does not weigh well the necessity as Ridgway saw it to balance the military needs with the human needs. Instead, Cook argues we focus solely on the human cost but not for the right reasons, we focus on the human cost for political reasons fulfilling a desire for "riskless wars." This endangers the profession of military arms and may bridge well with Peter D. Feaver's *Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations*, 100-102 thoughts on shirking.

¹⁰⁸ Jager. *Brothers at War: The Unending Conflict in Korea*, 169-171, 184.

¹⁰⁹ Gen Matthew Ridgway, (Lecture, School of Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 9 May 1984).

¹¹⁰ Ridgway, *The Korean War*, 110-111.

won.¹¹¹ Hard decisions do not exist solely in the heat of battle. The hard decisions for war exist in between battles where the lives and cost of action weigh.¹¹² Violence of thought and action require courage displayed by commitment and power of conviction. Kenneth Hamburger sums it up best, “The real importance of small-unit cohesion in any conflict is that unless company-sized and smaller units undertake their missions with conviction and accomplish them successfully, larger units cannot be successful. . . .”¹¹³ He further goes on to explain that weapons such as tanks and artillery do not complete missions without the spirit and leadership that humans bring to fighting and that the weapons alone are not providing the significant impact with which so much history seems to emphasize.¹¹⁴ Ridgway understood this about the men he led as he had led men who wanted and needed the same during World War II. Korea is about recognizing the need for a commander in touch with the psych-social aspects of waging war. He implicitly recognized this and created the context necessary to reinvigorate the physical and moral courage of Eighth Army.¹¹⁵ The general knew that the human spirit was an indelible feature of war. That while equipment helped to ensure the success of the men fighting the spirit and the man’s strength of

¹¹¹ McCullough, *Truman*, 835; Ridgway, *The Korean War*, 110-111. In *Truman* it is MacArthur decrying the savagery of war while in *The Korean War* it is Collins questioning the names as being problematic for the press. Ridgway did not worry about being politically correct. His answer was to be obvious and brutally honest a better way to communicate war to others is to make them wrestle with the realities of what war is and what you actually intend to do to your enemy.

¹¹² Gen Matthew Ridgway, (Lecture, School of Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 9 May 1984).

¹¹³ Hamburger, *Leadership in the Crucible*, 226-229

¹¹⁴ Ibid.

¹¹⁵ Halberstam, *The Coldest Winter: America and the Korean War*, 496-497.

courage were the true requirements that an army needed in order to win.¹¹⁶ General Winton once said that Eighth Army succeeded because “Ridgway turned the army around by breath[ing] humanity into that operation.”¹¹⁷

Courage and the ability to understand allows a commander to mitigate for risk or accept the risk weighed under the opportunity created. Recognizing that the equilibrium is always moving and unstable and does not form equivalence requires a mind that blends well the corporeal with the moral mechanisms of courage. War is an intellectual action always and the mental capacity of the leader informs the required physical component of battle. Understanding the people you lead will allow you to understand how to employ them best against the adversary’s forces. In describing a meeting with Ridgway about the Korean War, Roy Appleman was touched by the visible and verbal emotion Ridgway expressed for soldiers, “One’s appeal must be to the spiritual, and if it reaches the masses of soldiers, wonders can be accomplished.”¹¹⁸ Ridgway showed his ability to appreciate the varied people that made up Eighth Army and where they existed mentally when he took over, conceding that the tangible war in Korea was about the mental aptitude to fight. Once the mind was on board with the contest, the Eighth Army held and then attacked the Communist Chinese Forces within less than a month of his arrival to the Korean Peninsula. The shift of the battered mind to the fighting and winning mind created opportunity for Ridgway to gain moral advantage over a numerically superior rival and shifted the momentum positively in favor of the coalition forces. What soldiers said about Ridgway and his leadership is often about the intangible qualities, those hard to see but visible to them like the bayonet that is

¹¹⁶ Ibid., 497.

¹¹⁷ Harold Winton, (Lecture, School of Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 9 May 1984).

¹¹⁸ Appleman, *Ridgway Duels for Korea*, 18.

part of the soldier's kit.¹¹⁹ Courage is about belief in the purpose, the way, and the people who surround you. A leader will provide all of these by instilling the vision within those he leads to counter the rival system by then utilizing experience and resources to challenge competently the enemy while reinforcing his vision over time through the continued exploitation of courage.¹²⁰

Competence in Action

Ridgway's definition of competence included always being ready and prepared to be called and then when called to use experience, education, and understanding to know "where crises affecting one's command are likely to occur."¹²¹ In sports psychology, confidence is the game changer at the individual and team level. Athletes chosen for pro-sports who are technically quite good, may play for a few years (three to five), but athletes that are both technically good and have confidence play for double, if not more—the game changer that leads to a longer career is confidence.¹²² Ridgway also attributes all of the senses to competence while remaining in close proximity to allow his sense to filter and receive what is before him—basic troop leadership as he

¹¹⁹ Appleman, *Ridgway Duels for Korea*, 18-20; Jager, *Brothers at War: The Unending Conflict in Korea*, 156-158, 184-185; Halberstam, *The Coldest Winter: America and the Korean War*, 486-488, 496-499, 501-502; Hamburger, *Leadership in the Crucible*, 21-23, 82-83, 94-97, 196, 227-228; Max Hastings, *The Korean War* (New York: Simon & Schuster Paperbacks, 1987), 195-196; Millett, *The War for Korea, 1950-1951: They Came from the North*, 373, 556; Puryear, *American Generalship, Character is Everything: The Art of Command*, 90-91, 168-169; Salmon, *To the Last Round: The Epic British Stand on the Imjin River, Korea 1951*, 65-66, 109-110; Steuck, *The Korean War: an International History*, 167-168; Yup, *From Pusan to Panmunjon*, 114-115, 123, 129-130.

¹²⁰ Alexander, *The Character of a Leader: A Handbook for the Young Leader*, 25-29.

¹²¹ Mitchell, 21-22.

¹²² Gary Mack and David Casstevens, *Mind Gym: An Athlete's Guide to Inner Excellence* (McGraw Hill Professional, 2002), 156-157.

considered what made up competence.¹²³ Competence is that factor that accounts for a commander's ability to understand, visualize, describe, and direct.¹²⁴ Competence allows and creates opportunities for the commander to bring capabilities and resources to bear in order to both create and take initiative or repulse an enemy's attempt to take the initiative, in other words it is about "delivering the goods."¹²⁵ Ridgway showed competence during World War II on several occasions and many knew him as reliable and trustworthy when on the flanks of fellow commanders. A moment that stood out for many under his command was on La Fiere Bridge when he and all of his Battalion Commanders stood at the mouth of a bridge ahead of all of the soldiers leading the attack, "Ridgway grabbed the men by their shoulders and led them on to the causeway. An artillery officer who witnessed the action wrote: 'The most memorable sight that day was Ridgway, Gavin and Maloney standing right there where it was hottest.'¹²⁶ Mitchell continues to recount, "[E]very soldier who hit the causeway saw every general officer... regimental and battalion commanders.... Ridgway's innate courage, toughness, and resoluteness sparked the G.I.s' fertile imagination...."¹²⁷ Competence is the ability to bring together all of the disparate parts of an army to resolve complex problems of the individual to the team. Army effectiveness requires mastery of intelligence, communication, artillery, air, infantry, and the

¹²³ Ibid., 22.

¹²⁴ Headquarters, Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 5, *The Operations Process* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2012).

¹²⁵ Alexander, 32-33; Hamburger, 110, 152.

¹²⁶ Mitchell, *Matthew B. Ridgway: Soldier, Statesman, Scholar, Citizen*, 34-35.

¹²⁷ Ibid.

management of the cognitive space and the human dimension of warfare to be more than the situation calls for and at times allows.¹²⁸

On the subject of competence and leadership, scholarly work acknowledges that the commander fills the led with confidence when they view the commander or leader as being proficient or the experts of their fields. One may liken this to a surgeon a day out of medical school versus the veteran with twenty years of surgical experience. Most people may feel inexplicably more comfortable with the further experienced surgeon though the younger and newer surgeon may be as capable. Heather Wolters and several others looked at what level of competence a commander needs and highlighted skills that are more ambiguous than physical, including “adaptability, diplomacy, interpersonal skills, situational awareness, and sense making” ideas that are hard to train a person to have but that must be molded and acquired over time.¹²⁹ Experience and ability are important especially during events that bear greater stress or risk. These qualities account for nothing though, if you do not look at how others perceive the leader’s knowledge and capacity to do a given job. In this way, the interpretation of competence by the followers directly lends itself to the quality of respect. Cameron Anderson and Gavin Kilduff, absorbed by their studies while uncovering that dominance alone does not allow one to lead, but rather to be an effective dominant leader it is imperative that the leader have social skills that

¹²⁸ Shimon Naveh, *In Pursuit of Military Excellence: The Evolution of Operational Theory* (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 1997), 173,180, 183, 218-219, 223-224; Heather Wolters, Patrick O’Shea, Laura Ford, Matthew Fleisher, Mary Adeniyi, Claire Conzelman, and Russell Webster, “Identifying and Training Brigade Command Competencies,” *Military Psychology* 26, no.4 (July 2014): 278-279. Naveh’s description includes the commander as conductor of the orchestra responsible for ensuring the harmony and overall sound of the orchestra. Competent commanders understand the parts, how they complement each other and where there are gaps to bring about a holistic approach that produces and ensures success.

¹²⁹ Heather Wolters, et al., “Identifying and Training Brigade Command Competencies,” 278-281.

enable their dominant trait to gain the group's devotion.¹³⁰ Richard Boyatzis writes about the prominence of training emotional intelligence and the coupling of premeditated aspiration by the individual to understand and respect others, specifically when placed in a situation that is complex.¹³¹ Donna Chrobot-Mason and Jean Leslie further study part of this emotional intelligence and competence connection in looking at the multicultural understanding that leadership requires emphasizing that a multi-culturally aware leader is better able to communicate effectively across various groups within the organization, which further improves the efficacy of the entire organization within a given structure.¹³² Janice Laurence contributes further by looking at how competence in the military works to create trust while embracing an understanding of combat and culture for it is not the enemy alone that a leader must concern themselves with but they must also know their army and their allies to develop the relationship of trust and service.¹³³ The importance of the psychological aspect of competence develops further via his actions as the Eighth Army Commander and highlights the need for leaders that are and portray competence.

To be at the right place at the right time one must understand the area. In war, maps are key indicators of understanding. Ridgway viewed maps as the contours and relief that enabled or

¹³⁰ Cameron Anderson and Gavin Kilduff, "Why do Dominant Personalities Attain Influence in Face-to-Face Groups? The Competence-Signaling Effects of Trait Dominance," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 96, no. 2 (February 2009): 491.

¹³¹ Richard E. Boyatzis. "Leadership Development from a Complexity Perspective," *Consulting Psychology Journal Practice and Research* 60, no. 4 (December 2008): 298-301.

¹³² Donna Chrobot-Mason and Jean B. Leslie. "The Role of Multicultural Competence and Emotional Intelligence in Managing Diversity," *The Psychologist-Manager Journal* 15, no. 4 (2012): 219-220.

¹³³ Janice H. Laurence. "Military Leadership and the Complexity of Combat and Culture," *Military Psychology* 23, no. 5 (September 2011): 489-492.

constricted action.¹³⁴ The understanding gained by study of the environment hones the understanding of how to use resources and where resources may provide greater advantage. Human geography and physical geography, once linked in the commander's mind provide many opportunities. Maps are the physical way in which we can continually layer knowledge and understanding. Maps allow reflection that captures opportunity. Ridgway remarked,

Perhaps the chief advantage I derived from the isolation... was the opportunity provided for quiet hours of intense map study and for uninterrupted concentration on tactical plans for the Eighth Army.... [A] conscientious commander must understand precisely what the circumstances are under which his command must operate, and particularly which obstacles or advantages the terrain offers.¹³⁵

A leader in war needs to understand this to embark upon the greatest success. Knowing the mental and physical limitation of man allows one to know when to motivate and where to take heed of exhaustion. The general had the forethought to task Major General Garrison Davidson and the engineers with building fortifications and fall back defensive lines that included artillery positions and a network of trenches and barbed wire outposts.¹³⁶ This layered defense behind the forward operating lines provided Ridgway and Eighth Army with fully capable positions from which to defend if there was ever a need to retreat. He may have told all the commanders they were not retreating but this did not stop him from being practical and creating a back-up plan should things go poorly. His understanding of the geography and human needs created a set of fortifications he would never have to use yet were there in the event of great need.

Intelligence helps to fill in the blanks to a commander's knowledge and is part of the cognitive linchpin of success. Intelligence requires a great amount of resources to analyze and determine meaning, vulnerabilities, or accessibility. Intelligence, though, is also about conserving

¹³⁴ Ridgway, *The Korean War*, 88-89.

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*, 100.

¹³⁶ Appleman, *Ridgway Duels for Korea*, 85; Ridgway, *The Korean War*, 91-93.

resources, by understanding the rival to better utilize your assets or to get ahead of the enemy to disrupt and prevent future losses. Ridgway had an unalienable understanding of the requirement to think of intelligence holistically. It is this understanding of intelligence that drove him, intelligence had worked well for him in World War II and he attributed its effectiveness to saving lives.¹³⁷ He knew that intelligence can come from the on the ground intuition and fears of others. Early on, after having visited several command posts, he made a startling move, ordering several units into the Wonju area based first on the U.S. Ambassador to South Korea's assessment, and then further feelings he received from US Forces.¹³⁸ All of these concerns amounted to an understanding that the nearby Republic of Korea Forces were in a key, yet vulnerable position. The movement of several regiments prevented the Republic of Korea forces rout when the enemy attack came. However, the looming issue remained the lack of actionable intelligence that would permit Ridgway to take the fight to the enemy.¹³⁹

This intelligence problem permeated the air and contributed to the fear of the unknown in terms of the Chinese forces—their numbers and location—engendering a paralysis of action within Eighth Army. This drove the commander of Eighth Army to dig into intelligence to ascertain where the enemy was and he recalled how difficult it was during an interview in which

¹³⁷ Martin, *Soldier: the Memoirs of Matthew B. Ridgway*, 80-83; Mitchell, *Matthew B. Ridgway: Soldier, Statesman, Scholar, Citizen*, 39-47.

¹³⁸ Appleman, *Ridgway Duels for Korea*, 25-26. Ridgway had a great many “feelings” that something would happen in the Wonju area but no hard intelligence that supported these feelings or concerns. That he acted showed his faith and awareness that even embattled men know when something is wrong or where things may be less right than others. Intelligence may have a science associated with it, but the commander's ability to sense problems when there is little or no intelligence clearly depicts the necessity of competence derived from training opportunities and first hand or like experiences when possible. Nevertheless, commanders cannot rely on their gut feelings and require facts to enable better decision making.

¹³⁹ Appleman, 13-14.

he related a conversation with Bedell Smith, the head of the Central Intelligence Agency, and received nothing more than “[O]ne big goose egg out in front with 174,000 Chinese. That's all I've got, and I don't know whether they're in there or not. The only way that I can find out is to launch a careful, well-coordinated, probing attack to find out.”¹⁴⁰ Within this problem statement, he also knew the solution to his problem but it required utilizing the forces he wished to conserve for a fight with the Chinese. Ridgway's competence promoted by experience told him that if he lacked sound intelligence he needed to get after the blanks in his headquarters and the subordinate headquarters through activity. Ridgway immediately began conducting air reconnaissance ahead of Eighth Army lines. Ridgway in conjunction with air reconnaissance sent forces out to conduct patrols in order to develop the understanding of the enemy this action contributed to pushing the men out and getting them comfortable with the terrain and off the roads and chokepoints where the Chinese could unendingly harass them. His greatest issue though became getting the truth out of the subordinate units. Reports sometimes came in to the headquarters but often falsified to paint a different picture of that subordinate commander's section of the battlefield,

I wish you would please insure that every report to my headquarters contains the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, negative included.... I find also too many cases of failure to attack at the time ordered, failure to report jump-offs until asked. I expect every commander to insist upon the launching of an attack when ordered, and the immediate initiation of reports.... I want to invite your attention to the high importance of the maintenance of the direction of an attack. More attacks have I expect, have failed from this one cause than all others combined.¹⁴¹

His attention to this problem started to tighten up the staffs and allowed the headquarters to make more directed actions in support of his previously directed actions. Without veracity to these

¹⁴⁰ Matthew R. Ridgway, interviewed by Maurice Matloff, US Army War College, 18-19 April, 1984.

¹⁴¹ Appleman, *Ridgway Duels for Korea*, 388-389; Ridgway, *The Korean War*, 108, 118.

reports, a commander cannot provide resources or create options. Ridgway's acknowledgement of the importance of reporting allowed for greater effect of supporting combat operations and artillery fire and air support.¹⁴²

When Ridgway took command, he immediately desired to go on the attack.¹⁴³ However, he perceived through multiple visits to multiple headquarters and the front line that the army he inherited could not go on the attack. Mentally defeated they needed their confidence restored. One way to restore the army's confidence and rid it of the defeatist attitude that hung so heavy around its neck was to get units off the roads and hunting for the Chinese forces. Reconnaissance became the way to both figure out where the enemy existed in order to take the fight to the enemy in a more active role.¹⁴⁴ Field-Marshal Viscount Slim had encountered this issue during World War II in Burma. Slim knew well and cited constantly that poor patrols, reconnaissance, and lack of knowledge about the enemy situation was one of main reasons for the early series of defeats and failure.¹⁴⁵ Slim also noted that his soldiers were afraid to get off the roads and into the jungle.¹⁴⁶ In Korea, Ridgway's problem was not a jungle but a lack of desire to get off the easy roads in order to get at the enemy. The problem was training and therefore a lack of competence in the leaders and soldiers, a problem Slim noted as well as being a by-product of this lacking

¹⁴² Appleman, *Ridgway Duels for Korea*, 214-215. Artillery fire during Chip'yong-ni allowed for a company, from the French battalion led by Monclar, to fix bayonets and take back a hill that the Chinese had previously won. Moments created opportunity, which allowed for determined assaults against a determined enemy on the high ground.

¹⁴³ Jager, *Brothers at War: The Unending Conflict in Korea*, 156-157, 164, 166-167.

¹⁴⁴ Appleman, *Ridgway Duels for Korea*, 125, 156.

¹⁴⁵ Viscount Slim, *Defeat into Victory: Battling Japan in Burma and India, 1942-1945* (New York: Cooper Square Press, 2000), 115-121

¹⁴⁶ Ibid.

intelligence to effectively maneuver and stop the enemy.¹⁴⁷ Ridgway understood the problem as such and sought to rectify the issue by providing the impetus and consequently the training on how important it was to retain contact with the enemy forces in each sector.

The general's solutions were not always tactical nor were they always oriented on the enemy. He showed greater competence in understanding the men who fought by implementing programs and addressing wider needs than the physical demands of a combat area. One of the more interesting explorations of Ridgway's competence comes through his establishment of a rest and recuperation program and an exchange program that allowed personnel from every branch to swap jobs and assignments for a fixed period, in order to get a better appreciation for what combined operations truly looked like and accomplished. The rest and recuperation program, put in place within a few days of Ridgway's arrival into Korea sent soldiers back to Japan and sought to give a break to the men fighting in recognition of the need to provide a break to the combat weary troops who enjoyed the program immensely.¹⁴⁸ The exchange program met with limited success, but was vitally important to Ridgway as it helped to cross-level understanding between the branches while also providing a wider understanding of the conflict to a soldier, sailor, airman, or marines mind, by applying this program to Eighth Army he tried to increase understanding and awareness throughout the joint force.¹⁴⁹ He explained the exchange program thusly,

[W]ith sailors joining ground forces for a spell to see what it was like to carry your supplies all on your back up a rugged hill under enemy fire, to hang on to a forward position throughout a freezing night; with soldiers observing at firsthand the business of patrolling a wintry sea, every wave offering to knock you loose from your hand hold; or discovering the perils of trying to clean a flight deck of snow in the pre-dawn darkness

¹⁴⁷ Ridgway, *The Korean War*, 86-91, 97.

¹⁴⁸ Appleman, *Ridgway Duels for Korea*, 33.

¹⁴⁹ Ridgway, *The Korean War*, 103-104.

with the rough sea keeping the deck continually aslant; or what perils our airmen faced as they flew their missions of interdiction or armed reconnaissance in every kind of weather.

In both of these programs, Ridgway's desire to change the atmosphere and to look at the broader picture, the human side of the enterprise, allowed him flexibility and showed his passion to undertake change to transform the fighting man's perception of himself and of the war in which he was engaged.

The commander showed his competence within the combat oriented realm of the fight in Korea as well as the human understanding and cognitive space of warfare. His endeavor to bring out the fighting spirit extolled upon the necessity of good training and leaders providing leadership out front. What he provided to the Eighth Army in Korea were not always things he had done before but rather he adopted ideas and implemented changes based off his understanding of the terrain, the men, the enemy, and the nature of the Korean War. His methods and thoughts on leadership show his passion and understanding of a variety of complex, interactive environments. Goleman, Boyatzis, and McKee, note that,

No creature can fly with just one wing. Gifted leadership occurs where heart and head—feeling and thought—meet.... We see intellect and clear thinking largely as the characteristics that get someone in the leadership door... leaders execute a vision by motivating, guiding, inspiring, listening, persuading—and most crucially, through creating resonance.”¹⁵⁰

Ridgway created the needed character in convergence with courage and competence thus allowing the Eighth Army the time and space to develop and show its own character, courage and competence to the Chinese Forces.

¹⁵⁰ Daniel Goleman, Richard Boyatzis, and Annie McKee, *Primal Leadership: Unleashing the Power of Emotional Intelligence* (Harvard Business Review, August 2013), 26-27.

Conclusion

Why study something that occurred over seventy years ago? Because the study of leadership in preparation for and in the midst of war continues to provide evidence of the relevance of the human dimension of war, without which war becomes unhinged and impractical.¹⁵¹ Ridgway went on to further success and remained outspoken throughout what remained of his career on issues that he felt required his attention. His career in the Army ended in 1955 after serving as the Chief of Staff of the Army. Many believe President Dwight D. Eisenhower fired him because of his disagreements with the president. In truth, he met his mandatory retirement date—and exceeded it—because the president waived the requirement and allowed him to remain on a few months more. This story, and many others, shows the complexities behind personal interactions and the way in which others see them and interpret them. Leadership resonates with interpretation, thought, and action orientation. Ridgway's passion for leadership never faltered and it is this life-long desire to read, learn, and challenge himself that allowed him to arrive in December 1950 and begin to fix things for Eighth Army.

The point was to highlight how Lieutenant General Matthew Bunker Ridgway transformed the Eighth Army into a capable and successful fighting force. The answer provided entails the importance of Ridgway's three C's—character, courage, and competence. Leadership, as demonstrated by Ridgway, continually points to that all too important and often neglected feature of war the personality of the commander, and in order to understand leadership the dissection of character, courage, and competence is compulsory. The Army's desire to capture the importance of the human dimension is in part an acknowledgement of the failings to understand

¹⁵¹ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. and trans. by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989).

the old face of war.¹⁵² War does not equate to the digital component but rather it is the analog or the deep-rooted ways that continue to provide the impetus for success regardless of the era. Technology cannot provide understanding and technology provides data. This requires the human interface to synthesize the information into the realm of useful fed by a growing understanding of the situation and environment to which the individual is exposed.¹⁵³ To focus on the tool is to disregard the human impact or to become blinded by too much information and resources. He summed up leadership as involving character, courage, and competence. There is one thing he did not capture because he was too close to the actual word. In thinking of leadership, there are concepts that we cannot teach and Ridgway shows the importance of passion. Experience can be gained through realistic training and through hardship, but the true value of a commander is intangible and is the regard they have for those they are responsible for and ultimately to while in command. However, you cannot fake leadership as you cannot fake passion. The army's latest foray into the human dimension concerns itself with terms that allow too great a distance to be achieved thus going against leadership's ideal. Connecting the passion for leadership connects the innate desire by the leader for constant refinement. Leadership is constant study and reflective practice.

The Army's own studies on leadership, point to the interesting convergence of personality and ability. Edmund Sebree, a retired general officer, saw a lack of analysis on the part of the Army that looked at higher-level commands and leadership requirements. Specifically,

¹⁵² U.S. Army TRADOC, "The US Army Operating Concept: Win in a Complex World, 2020-2040" (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office).

¹⁵³ Puryear, *American Generalship, Character is Everything: The Art of Command*, x-xvi.

he noted that higher-level commanders require an understanding of “psychology or sociology” and that there are specific characteristics a commander must develop,

Sociology is concerned with the behavior of groups, psychology with the behavior of the individual in varying environments and under varying stimuli. Every leader of troops necessarily acquires some knowledge of both sciences at the practical level. Command experience, particularly in the lower grades, gives the observant officer considerable insight into the behavior of soldiers, their response to military orders, and their almost instinctive reaction to certain environments. Increasing experience and maturity add to this knowledge on the part of the higher-level commander.¹⁵⁴

Stephen Zacaro looked at “officer attributes” and a continued desire by officers and leaders to learn especially at higher ranks accounting for drive as one of the main factors behind successful leadership in complex environments, especially when coupled with the right personality.¹⁵⁵ Sean Hannah, Peter Jennings, and Orly Nobel note the difficulty the Army has in showing the “how to be a leader” hence the inability of the Army to bridge the process to the practice of leadership further, that the models provided are structures that do not address the art of leadership especially to and in a complex environment.¹⁵⁶ Sean Hannah, Donald Campbell, and Michael Matthews note that leadership in and of itself is a complex environment and thus the study of leadership in dangerous environments becomes an undertaking involving various capabilities, awareness, intuition, characteristics, and experience that further is different for every

¹⁵⁴ Edmund Seabee, *Leadership at Higher Levels of Command as Viewed by Senior and Experienced Combat Commanders* (Alexandria, VA: George Washington University, 1961), iii, 36.

¹⁵⁵ Stephen J. Zacaro, “A Commentary on Army Officer Research: From Alpha to Delta,” *Military Psychology* 26, no. 4 (July 2014): 343-347.

¹⁵⁶ Sean T. Hannah, Peter L. Jennings, and Orly Ben-Yoav Nobel. “Tactical Military Leader Requisite Complexity: Toward a Referent Structure,” (Wake Forest University, School of Business), 412-415.

individual and for every situation.¹⁵⁷ Halpin asserts that leadership methods are inadequate being formulaic in approach by providing a prescriptive answer to a non-prescriptive problem, further formulas do not sufficiently address the geo-political landscape, structures, the mixing of the military and civilian environments, and the further disaggregation of bottom-level leadership to the top-level leadership's views.¹⁵⁸ Finally in a study on toxic leadership in the military, Jessica Gallus, Benjamin Walsh, Marinus van Driel, Melissa Gouge, and Emily Antolic looked at "destructive leadership" and its significant effects across a unit and to the unit's family members seen in increased alcoholism, through abuse of family members and subordinates, higher stress, fatigue with the environment, and lack of regard for traditional organizational customs and courtesies.¹⁵⁹

Because he cared, exhibited compassion, and developed understanding were at the heart of Ridgway's leadership model. He did not rest on his leadership laurels and success gained during World War II but modified it to fit the manner of the fight and the needs of those he led. A large part of how Ridgway developed as a leader required continuous study of other leaders. It is the importance of being serious about leadership as a vocation, which Ridgway stressed, meant, "Read widely and wisely all history and biography possible. Soak up all the personal experiences

¹⁵⁷ Sean T. Hannah, Donald J. Campbell, and Michael D. Matthews. "Advancing a Research Agenda for Leadership in Dangerous Contexts," *Military Psychology* 22 (2010): 157-169.

¹⁵⁸ Stanley M. Halpin. "Nature of Leadership within the Military Environment," *Military Psychology* 23, no. 5 (September 2011): 479-480.

¹⁵⁹ Jessica A. Gallus, Benjamin M. Walsh, Marinus van Driel, Melissa C. Gouge, and Emily Antolic. "Intolerable Cruelty: A Multilevel Examination of the impact of Toxic Leadership on U.S. Military Units and Service Members," *Military Psychology* 25, no. 6 (November 2013): 588-590. Further the article highlights that Toxic Leadership is ego driven and tyrannical in nature and that the toxic leader does not seek to understand or even show awareness of the environment and effects of his or her leadership style on subordinates or the organization.

you can of battle-tested brother officers. This broadens your understanding of an art that you can never hope to know all. Study thoughtfully the records of past successful leaders and adapt their methods to yours.”¹⁶⁰ Further, Ridgway commented that,

You learned so many things that these officers had in their personal combat experiences in handling men. You learned the pitfalls of those who had failed, and this, combined with your reading, provided the major sources of for your fruitful leadership later on. A man by himself can have but a very limited personal experience. So you’ve got to draw on the experience of others, both in reading and in talking to men who have made their names in combat, who have demonstrated superior leadership.¹⁶¹

Eisenhower agreed with Ridgway on this and pushed the importance of histories and biographies as well as being around decision makers as being a substantial factor in his success as a leader.¹⁶²

George C. Marshall thought the same way and considered reading part of his professional duties and responsibility even at the end of his career.¹⁶³ The great mentor, Major General Fox Conner utilized the study of history through books and maps with those he coached and upon conclusion of assigned reading would ask questions about the readings. Conner did this to the officers he took under his wing on top of their day-to-day duties.¹⁶⁴ This shows an expectation that leadership and those who study it want and desire to be better leaders though they may have to put long hours in to gain that knowledge and understanding. In the Army’s Army Doctrine

¹⁶⁰ Mitchell, *Matthew B. Ridgway: Soldier, Statesman, Scholar, Citizen*, 23.

¹⁶¹ Puryear, *American Generalship—Character is Everything: The Art of Command*, 168-169.

¹⁶² *Ibid.*, 142-144.

¹⁶³ *Ibid.*, 154

¹⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 156-157

Publication, 6-22 that focuses purely on leadership, there is no mention of these simple yet meaningful and available lessons on leadership.¹⁶⁵

The Army convolutes its approach to leadership. The Army describes yet refrains from saying how to be a better leader. There is concern over “Toxic Leadership” and rooting it out but this is a reactive stance and not a proactive attitude. The gaps are noted by further exploration of the Army’s Operating Concept, yet again there is missing the simplistic approach of so many others,

Decentralized operations in complex environments require *competent* leaders and cohesive teams that thrive in conditions of uncertainty. Leaders foster discipline, confidence, and cohesion through innovative, realistic training. Repetitive training combined with *self-study*, rigorous *education* in joint and Army institutions, and leader development in units ensures that Army forces thrive in chaotic environments. Army forces gain *intellectual* advantages over adversaries through *cross-cultural competencies* and *advanced cognitive abilities*. Leaders think ahead in time to anticipate opportunities and dangers and take prudent risk to gain and maintain positions of relative advantage over the enemy. Leaders foster trust among other leaders and Soldiers. They develop unit cultures that encourage the exercise of initiative consistent with the philosophy of mission command. Leaders and Soldiers are committed to each other and the Army professional ethic.¹⁶⁶

The Army’s methodology creates a gap that becomes clearer after researching leadership during the Korean War, a place in history full of struggle and internal issues for the Army. These struggles with leadership mirror today’s Army as it looks to learn lessons from Iraq and Afghanistan. Using many words to convey a simple idea does not create genuine understanding but appears to show an uncertainty with what leadership is and how to cultivate leadership

¹⁶⁵ Conduct a word search for “reading” (or a variant) or “history” or “biography” and find nothing, yet the word “process” appears over ten times (not including the chart) in as many pages and “experience” shows up six times. The problem thus seems to be that we refer to leadership as more mechanical when instead leadership requires awareness and intuition.

¹⁶⁶ Win in a Complex World, 20. Emphasis added to note that one may construe that Army personnel should read histories and biographies. The Chief of Staff of the Army has a reading list that is informative, accessed March 13, 2015, http://www.history.army.mil/html/books/105/105-1-1/CMH_Pub_105-5-1_2014.pdf.

without the frequency of war to produce the experience gained. Desiring leaders to be agile, flexible, creative, etc... does nothing to shape leaders and their abilities to develop these traits. Leaders never fully arrive, they are always students of leadership, studying others and practicing their art. Management and leadership is not synonymous. “Leaders” that are process oriented have succumbed to management styles and practices and are consequently no longer leaders. Building widgets every day is not complex endeavor, it requires managers and workers to do their jobs but it does not vary nor does it require creativity, in fact, creativity on an assembly line gets frowned upon for good reason—maximizing output is more important than tinkering with the system. To win in a complex world leadership is required.

In looking at a way forward one need look back to the lessons of Ridgway or other leaders. The value is there, of as much value to the Eighth Army in 1950 and 1951 as it is today, and will be in the future. The impact of a life led in study of other leaders resounds throughout his tenure as the Eighth Army Commander. Several parents of soldiers and marines wrote letters of thanks to Ridgway. Their comments exposing the importance of his efforts from better food, discipline, pride in what they were doing, and that he was a father like figure to their young sons.¹⁶⁷ He was then and remains today many things to many people. To some he was harsh and inflexible and others viewed him as a God who came to fix all the woes of the Eighth Army. In actuality, there is truth to the entire spectrum, some may think his leadership in terms akin to what we use today when we describe toxic leadership, and others may think his style worthy of complete emulation. What we can say when we look at his short tenure is that something happened that did not equate to better or more equipment but rather points to an entire organizational shift in thought and action. There is value in reading about success and failure, but as with all things complex there is an interpretation of the value of that style and form of

¹⁶⁷ Appleman, *Ridgway Duels for Korea*, 389.

leadership. The study of leadership is a lonely venture; the application is subject to everyone that falls under or near the practice of leadership. Ridgway's thoughts on leadership provide the final say,

In all this I was studiously trying to avoid those practices on the part of my predecessor that I regarded as faulty. In any event, one of my cardinal rules of battle leadership—or leadership in any field—is to be yourself, to strive to apply the basic principles of the art of war, and to seek to accomplish your assigned missions by your own methods and in your own way.¹⁶⁸

Read widely those who have had to make decisions and the manner in which they have had to make them, their personality and character will come out and then reflect on what they did right or what they did wrong. This in turn provides the thought that can guide future action when called upon to be a leader.

¹⁶⁸ Ridgway, *The Korean War*, 163. This comment was made upon his reflection of taking over from MacArthur when he was fired by President Truman, though it seemed to be the way in which he thought of leadership regardless of the timeframe and the surrounding issues.

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